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Abstract 
Traditional nomological accounts of scientific explanation have assumed that a good scientific 
explanation consists in the derivation of the explanandum’s description from theory (plus antecedent 
conditions). But in more recent philosophy of science the adequacy of this approach has been challenged, 
because the relation between theory and phenomena in actual scientific practice turns out to be more 
intricate. This critique is here examined for an explanatory paradigm that was groundbreaking for 20th 
century physics and chemistry (and their interrelation): Bohr’s first model of the atom and its explanatory 
relevance for the spectrum of hydrogen. First, the model itself is analysed with respect to the principles 
and assumptions that enter into its premises. Thereafter, the origin of the model’s explanandum is 
investigated. It can be shown that the explained “phenomenon” is itself the product of a host of modelling 
accomplishments that stem from an experimental tradition related to 19th century chemistry, viz. 
spectroscopy. The relation between theory and phenomenon is thus mediated in a twofold way: by 
(Bohr’s) theoretical model and a phenomenological model from spectroscopy. In the final section of the 
paper an account is outlined that nevertheless permits us to acknowledge this important physico-chemical 
achievement as a case of (nomological) explanation. 
 
Within the philosophical analysis of scientific explanation, natural laws have 
traditionally played a prominent role. The traditional assumption is that a successful 
explanation of a phenomenon consists in the derivation of its description from at least 
one natural law and a set of antecedent conditions. The family of approaches starting 
from this assumption can be subsumed under the label ‘nomological scheme of 
scientific explanation’. It has been subject to persistent criticism in the past decades. 
The predominant line of disagreement (concentrating primarily on the symmetry of 
explanation and prediction1) has been maintaining that the sufficient criteria of the 
nomological scheme are too generous; that it admits instances which are in fact no 
explanations. 
In this paper, however, I will concentrate on the more recent criticism purporting 
that the necessary criteria of the nomological scheme are too strict—taking them 
seriously, one would not find any explanations in the sciences at all. This line of 
criticism has primarily been put forward by Nancy Cartwright. According to her, the 
nomological scheme is something like a pious fiction that cannot be located in the 
reality of scientific practice. She suggests that the variform and erratic reality of 
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experience can only by made describable and controllable in highly situative laboratory 
contexts. Phenomenological models serve to achieve this goal. These can in turn be 
brought into a mediated relation to theoretical laws, but a direct derivation of 
phenomena from laws is, according to Cartwright, out of the question: “[T]o explain a 
phenomenon is to construct a model which fits the phenomenon into a theory.” 
(Cartwright, 1983, 17.) Laws do not have an explanatory function within this task: 
[L]aws—in the conventional empiricist sense—have no fundamental role to play 
in scientific theory. In particular, scientific explanation seems to proceed entirely 
without them. They are the end-point of explanation and not the source. 
(Cartwright, 1989, 185.) 
In this paper, Cartwright’s thesis that the relation between theory and phenomenon is 
only fashioned by means of the mediation of models will be illustrated by a prominent 
example: I will undertake a close inspection of Bohr’s first model of the hydrogen atom. 
However, I also intend to show that the laws of physical theory can, pace Cartwright’s 
pessimism, explain natural phenomena with the aid of mediating models. Bohr’s 
example is a good case in point that the use of models is not an indicator for the limited 
explanatory power of natural laws, but that models are a part of nomological 
explanations and extend their scope—if we base our considerations on a conception of 
nomological explanation that conforms to actual scientific practice. 
1. Bohr’s model: elements of theory and antecedent conditions 
There is a very simple view of Bohr’s first model of the hydrogen atom as published in 
1913.2 According to this view, Bohr assembled some new and many old elements of 
physical theory, postulated an inner structure of the hydrogen atom and derived, from 
all this, the frequencies of the spectral radiation of hydrogen. (Which therefore, 
according to the nomological scheme, also received an explanation.) But this rough 
sketch is rather a caricature. A more precise look at Bohr’s actual proceeding brings 
new details into view.3 
Let us first describe Bohr’s model, beginning with the antecedent conditions: 
• The antecedent conditions governing the arrangements of theoretical elements in 
Bohr’s model follow the example of Ernest Rutherford’s model. Electrons are 
orbiting a nucleus whose spatial extension is negligible if compared to the radius of 
the orbit. The positive electrical charge of the atom is concentrated in the nucleus, 
etc. 
• Another important antecedent condition is the number of electrons. Bohr himself had 
shown, in a paper on the absorption of α-particles, that the hydrogen atom possesses 
exactly one electron. (Cf. Mehra and Rechenberg, 1982, 185.) 
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More decisive for the character of Bohr’s model are the natural laws and theoretical 
principles that, according to Bohr, govern this arrangement of antecedent conditions. In 
what follows, I will refer to these collectively as ‘elements of theory’. 
• First, we have classical elements of theory like Newtonian mechanics and Coulomb’s 
law. They describe the stationary states of the model. The electron can also be 
numbered among the classical elements of theory. Since J.J. Thomson’s experiments, 
it had an allocated place in physical theory, including increasingly established values 
of its charge e and mass m, which were conceived of as natural constants. 
• But the classical elements are complemented by the quantum hypothesis, i.e. the 
theoretical assumption that electromagnetic radiation only exists in certain energy 
doses hν depending in size on the frequency ν (h being Planck’s constant), each of 
which is homogeneous with regard to frequency. Bohr had already arrived at the 
conviction that the classical theories were insufficient for the purposes of atomic 
physics in his dissertation on the physics of electrons in metals: (Cf. Heilbron und 
Kuhn, 1969, 213-223.) “The cause of failure is very likely this: that the 
electromagnetic theory does not agree with the real conditions in matter.” (Cit. from 
Heilbron, 1985, 29.) The citation shows that for Bohr, the quantum hypothesis was 
not an ad hoc supposition, but a prerequisite for a suitable theoretical frame. 
• An additional element of theory must be seen in Bohr’s principle of correspondence. 
The theory now contained competing principles of electromagnetic radiation, one 
classical and one quantum-theoretical. The necessity emerged to prevent 
contradictions at the joint of their realms of application. The principle of 
correspondence serves this purpose. In its early form it essentially says that the 
radiation emitted (resp. absorbed) by the atom during changes between states of 
higher energy (i.e. states of large orbital radius and low orbital velocity) must 
approximate the one predicted by the classical theory of a charged oscillator. Bohr 
does not extract this principle from established theory, but establishes it as a new 
element of theory. It was to survive several changes of Bohr’s atomic model and 
even the crisis of the older quantum theory in the 1920’s. (Cf. Falkenburg, 1997, 34 
f.) 
We will now investigate how far elements of theory and antecedent conditions such as 
the ones indicated above can help us to determine all of the characteristics of Bohr’s 
first model of the atom.  
The hypothesis of quantum discontinuity serves to solve the notorious problems 
of Rutherford’s model. The radiation of an electron spiralling towards the nucleus 
would be continuous and continuously changing in wavelength. Just this kind of 
radiation is prohibited, for atomic dimensions, by the quantum hypothesis. Therefore, 
Bohr’s model must have stationary states with stable orbits. The task remains to settle 
just which states are the stationary ones. 
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2. Bohr’s model: a decisive additional supposition 
In the transition from a state of energy W to one of energy W
 
', the atom must, according 
to the quantum hypothesis, emit an homogeneous dose of radiation with frequency ν, 
where 
(1) ν = −W
h
W
h
'
. 
Bohr got acquainted with the efforts of researchers in spectroscopy to grasp the 
empirically determined spectral lines of hydrogen by means of a clear mathematical 
representation. The decisive success in this enterprise is generally attributed to Johann 
Jakob Balmer. In later years, Bohr declared (in an interview with Léon Rosenberg): “As 
soon as I saw Balmer’s formula the whole thing was immediately clear to me.” (Cit. 
from Mehra and Rechenberg, 1982, 188.) In fact, Bohr was starting from the following 
more general formula due to Janne Robert Rydberg: 
(2) ν = −R c
n
R c
n
H H
1
2
2
2 . 
Here c is the speed of light and RH an empirical constant, the so-called Rydberg 
constant. Inserting pairs of natural numbers, n1 < n2, the frequencies of the spectral 
radiation of hydrogen result. 
Now Bohr makes a momentous supposition: He assumes that the formal similarity 
of equations (1) and (2) is rooted in a kinship in content. This is evidenced by the fact 
that he presumes that (2) represents the transition form the n2-th state to the n1-th. While 
for experimental physicists like Rydberg the numbers n1 and n2 had only been 
calculational devices without physical meaning, in Bohr’s model they turn into ordinal 
numbers of stationary states. 
On the basis of this supposition, the successful construction of the remaining 
determinants of Bohr’s model ensues according to the following outline. (Cf. Bohr, 
1981 [1914], [294].) Equating W/h from (1) with RHc/n² from (2) yields the energy 
values for the stationary states. From these and from the classical laws for a point mass 
orbiting around a centre of force, values for the angular frequencies ωn can be derived, 
such that ωn only depends on the number n of the state and some constants including the 
empirical Rydberg constant. This is important for the principle of correspondence which 
is supposed to warrant a smooth transition from the quantum-theoretical to the classical 
treatment of electromagnetic radiation. The classical treatment is based on the notion of 
a wave caused by an oscillator. If the orbiting electron is to impersonate this oscillator, 
then the orbital frequency ωn must approximate the frequency ν of radiation in the 
transition between the n-th and the (n+1)-th state for large n. It turns out that exactly this 
happens if the Rydberg constant is calculated from the constants e, m, c and h according 
to 
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One of the most important triumphs of Bohr’s model of the atom is the excellent match 
of this value for RH with the one empirically determined. 
The fact that this triumph is ultimately based upon the identification of elements 
from the formulas (1) and (2) has prompted John Heilbron and Thomas Kuhn (1969, 70) 
to conclude that Rydberg’s formula (2) is itself a premise of Bohr’s model. But as we 
have seen, the value of RH is a result of his theoretical considerations. What is 
presupposed by Bohr is merely the form of (2). Admittedly, this alone is noteworthy 
enough. We must diagnose that a supposition enters into Bohr’s model that is neither 
justified by elements of theory nor by his chosen antecedent conditions. It is the 
assumption that the frequency of the radiation emitted (resp. absorbed) in the transition 
between the n1-th stationary state and the n2-th can be represented in a formula of the 
form  
(4) 





−= 2
2
2
1
11
nn
Cν , with C a constant. 
Assumptions that can be negatively characterised in just this way (i.e., as belonging 
neither to the elements of theory endorsed in the model nor to the antecedent 
conditions) often enter into processes of theoretical modelling. I will refer to them as 
“additional assumptions”. 
The mere presence of additional assumptions (that characteristically lack any kind 
of deductive or inductive support prior to the construction of the model) is apt to cast 
doubt upon the explanatory force of such a model. But we will return to that later. 
Leaving the question of explanatoriness aside for the moment, one could still be 
inclined to admit that Bohr has succeeded in theoretically modelling a natural 
phenomenon, viz. the phenomenon of the spectral radiation of hydrogen. 
But there is another complication lurking here, urging us to concede a point to 
Nancy Cartwright. What the model arrives at, viz. Rydberg’s formula for the spectral 
lines of atomic hydrogen, is itself a model.4 I will call this model a phenomenological 
model (as opposed to ‘theoretical model’, which applies to Bohr’s own considerations). 
In the following section, I will outline some of the modelling achievements contained in 
this model. They have primarily been effected by 19th century experimental science.  
3. The phenomenological model of hydrogen 
In the mid-1850’s, Gustav Kirchhoff and Robert Bunsen studied diverse substances by 
burning them in a colourless gas flame and decomposing the emitted light into its 
various coloured constituents. They confirmed that the emitted spectrum is 
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characteristic for each chemical substance, and that the spectral lines of elementary 
substances also appear in the spectra of chemical composites containing them. 
Kirchhoff and Bunsen thereby established the spectrum as a fingerprint of the chemical 
element.5 
In the 1870’s, interest increased among scientists to bring order into the as yet 
inscrutable tangle of lines of each individual spectrum. By and by, the spectrum of 
hydrogen became the preferred object of these efforts. Therefore, it became very 
desirable to certify a satisfactory number of sufficiently precise wavelengths of the 
hydrogen spectrum. For a long time, there were only four lines that could be 
unambiguously attributed to the hydrogen spectrum. A systematic study of the 
ultraviolet spectrum of hydrogen, published in 1879 by Hermann Wilhelm Vogel, 
marked an important progress in this enterprise.  (Vogel, 1879a, 1879b.) Vogel, a 
chemist at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, had constructed a 
specially developed apparatus, the “Spectrograph”, to photograph the spectrum. 
 
  Vogel’s “Grosser Spectrograph”. From Schellen, 1883, 438 f. 
Special attention had to be paid to screen off disturbing light, because the ultraviolet 
part of the spectrum turned out to be extremely weak. For the same reason, Vogel used 
two flint glass prisms, since regular glass absorbs ultraviolet light in great proportions. 
And he projected the spectrum to newly developed gelatine dry plates, allowing a longer 
exposure than the traditional wet plates. (Cf. Vogel, 1879a, 116.) 
All experimental circumspection could not eliminate one source of disturbance. 
The hydrogen was contained, under very low pressure, in glass tubes, so-called Geissler 
tubes, to which electrical voltage could be applied in order to stimulate the gas to glow. 
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But during the production of the hydrogen, total purity could not be obtained.6 As a 
result, the photographs contained several lines known to belong to spectra of substances 
other than hydrogen. Some lines also conspicuously coincided with spectral lines of 
mercury. Mercury vacuum pumps were used to make the Geissler tubes. (One such 
impurity of the hydrogen spectrum in a Geissler tube proves to be inexpugnable even to 
this day: There are always some H2 molecules in the tube excited by the voltage, such 
that the spectrum of the H atom is invariably superposed by a molecular spectrum.7) 
As a result of all this, there had to be a decision based upon a certain effort of 
interpretation in order to determine which of the lines belong to the spectrum of 
hydrogen. A negative comparison had to be carried through with the known spectral 
lines of other substances that could reasonably be expected in the Geissler tubes, as well 
as a positive comparison with spectral decompositions of starlight in which a great 
hydrogen proportion was suspected. Vogel himself undertook a tentative alignment of 
the 32 wavelengths measured by him with a multitude of known values, but much had 
to be left open. He refrained from explicitly explicating individual new lines as 
hydrogen lines. 
This attribution was only achieved with some definiteness by a discovery made by 
Johann Jakob Balmer in 1884. Balmer, a Swiss grammar school teacher with a penchant 
for number problems, was looking for a simple mathematical formula to account for all 
wavelengths of the hydrogen spectrum. By a method of trial and error, he found the 
following remarkably simple expression: 
(5) λ =
−
h m
m n
2
2 2 ,  where n = 2 and h = ⋅
−3645 6 10 10, m . 
Inserting the natural numbers from 3 to 10 for m, one gets wavelengths for the four 
visible hydrogen lines, as well as for four of Vogel’s ultraviolet lines. The astronomer 
William Huggins had observed an additional line in the light of white stars, matching 
well with the value for m = 11.8 
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   a) Two of Vogel’s photographs of the hydrogen spectrum, with the spectrum of the sun for comparison 
(supplement “Tafel I” from Vogel, 1879b). 
   b) Graphic representation of the lines measured in Vogel’s experiments (from Vogel, 1879b, 589). 
   c) The selection effected by Balmer’s formula. 
With respect to the totality of Vogel’s results, however, the selection effected by 
Balmer’s formula seems utterly ad hoc. Weak lines are attributed to the hydrogen 
spectrum (like line no. 1), while other lines are neglected that had been classified by 
Vogel as “quite strong” or “stronger” and could not be attributed to any known 
substance (especially lines no. 6, 22 and 30).  
Then what was the justification to accept the Βalmer formula as a representation 
of the hydrogen spectrum? It was simply the notion that the spectrum had to be the 
product of a single physical system, which had spawned the expectation of a uniform 
mathematical representation. Already prior to Balmer's discovery, physicists had 
pondered the wavelengths and found it “conspicuous that they lie on, or very near, a 
definite curve, which would not happen by chance”, as Gerorge Johnstone Stoney 
commented on Huggins’ starlight spectra. He also concluded that the source of the 
radiation had to be “one physical system”, possibly “some vibrating system (like those 
of an elastic rod or bell for example)”.9 In keeping with the same analogy, Arthur 
Schuster had announced to the BAAS in 1882 the ambition of spectroscopy “to find out 
the shape of a bell by means of the sounds which it is capable of sending out.”10 Though 
Balmer’s formula did not immediately suggest any conclusions about the nature of the 
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radiation’s source, it provided a mathematical regularity that could serve as the basis for 
further generalisations and research. 
When some years later Janne Robert Rydberg and Walther Ritz developed 
generalisations of the Balmer formula, they were still working on the phenomenological 
surface. They arrived at the formula 
(6) 1 1 1
1
2
2
2λ = −





R
n n
H , 
which, in the form of (2), was later to play the decisive role in Bohr’s model. It was 
equivalent11 to Balmer’s original version for n1 = 2 and n2 = 3, 4, 5, … , but could also 
accommodate the infrared lines that Friedrich Paschen had discovered in 1908 (for 
n1 = 3 und n2 = 4, 5, 6, … ). 
We see now that the Rydberg formula (6) is the end product of an elaborate 
process of material manipulation (purification of the hydrogen, inclusion in an 
apparatus designed to accentuate the sought-after ultraviolet lines) as well as conceptual 
manipulation (selection of the spectral lines that are supposed to belong to the hydrogen 
spectrum, representation by uniform mathematical expressions). Both kinds of 
manipulations have been highlighted as crucial elements of modelling by Ernan 
McMullin, who called them “causal idealization” and “construct idealization” 
(McMullin, 1985, 254-259, 264-268). I maintain that the result of these manipulations 
should be called a phenomenological model. This is not just because it contains 
idealisations—which alone makes it a model, but does not explain in which sense it is a 
phenomenological one. 
What makes the representation a phenomenological one is, I suggest, that it was 
arrived at by means of a modelling process that started from measurements and 
observations, and received relatively little theoretical information on the way. This 
concept of phenomenological model partly reflects that the notion was first used in the 
philosophical discussion in order to label purely descriptive representations lacking any 
theoretical justification (cf., e.g., Cartwright et al., 1995). Margaret Morrison has 
criticised this way to distinguish between theoretical and phenomenological models 
(Morrison 1999). She argues that the models typically described as phenomenological 
are neither free of theory, nor are they the only ones to describe or represent reality—the 
so-called theoretical models can do so as well.  
Though I think that both these points must be acknowledged, I still maintain that 
the distinction can be useful if it is used to distinguish models according to their 
provenance. While a theoretical model is assembled from elements of theory, a 
phenomenological model’s history begins with an account of observed properties or 
behaviour, which is then transformed into a useful description. The modelling process 
takes a different direction in each case.  
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The distinction may still not be clear-cut and exclusive in each and every case: 
There may be models that start at both ends and piece together elements of theory and 
phenomenological descriptions at the same time. But there are many cases where we 
can identify a phenomenological and a theoretical model in the sense above; and the 
first explanation of the hydrogen spectrum is one of them.12 
When it is said that Niels Bohr explained the spectrum of hydrogen, what is 
claimed is usually that in his model the Rydberg formula (2)/(6) can be derived. Yet the 
history of spectroscopy shows that it was never simply given what “the spectrum of 
hydrogen” is. Rather, the formula derived from Bohr’s model is itself a 
(phenomenological) model. 
4. Bohr’s model as a nomological explanation: outline of an altered scheme 
From the perspective of the traditional nomological scheme, these findings about Bohr’s 
model cast severe doubts upon its explanatoriness for two reasons. The first is that 
nomological schemes do not admit additional suppositions as found in Bohr’s 
theoretical model. Premises of an explanation must either be natural laws (replaced, in 
our analysis, by the more generous concept of elements of theory) or independently 
verifiable antecedent conditions.13 The second reason is that the theoretical model does 
not permit the derivation of a true and straightforward description of some given 
phenomenon, but only of an idealised, materially and conceptually manipulated replica 
of a phenomenon—a phenomenological model. 
Observations like the characteristics of the modelling process that have been 
emphasised so far have prompted Nancy Cartwright to deny the explanatory force of 
natural laws altogether. However, I think that in spite of these historical findings it can 
still make sense to maintain that Bohr did explain the spectrum of hydrogen. (Of course, 
this judgement requires an historically qualified assessment of explanatory 
achievements. From a present day perspective, we wouldn’t accept Bohr’s model as an 
explanation for the simple reason that it makes presuppositions which we hold to be 
false—e.g., that electrons can do such things as describe orbits.) 
To expose the explanatory merits of our case, it is useful to consider the 
possibility of an altered scheme of nomological explanations that takes into account the 
role of theoretical and phenomenological models in the explanatory process. (The 
scheme is in fact inspired by Cartwright’s own “simulacrum account” of scientific 
explanation; Cf. Cartwright 1983, ch. 8. However, it is constructed not as an alternative 
to the nomological scheme, but as its refinement. Models must then be regarded not as 
disrupting the explanatory scope of laws, but as carrying it forward.) According to this 
altered scheme, to explain a phenomenon is to idealise it into a phenomenological 
model that can in turn be set into a relation of analogy to a theoretical model. The 
positive analogy must at least include those aspects of the phenomenological model that 
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are supposed to receive an explanation. The corresponding theoretical model must be a 
concretisation from natural laws. That means that the theoretical model is an abstract 
structure collectively defined by some laws and some concretising conditions. The latter 
may include the usual antecedent conditions as well as additional suppositions as in 
Bohr’s case, for the requirement of independent verifiability turns out to be too strict. 
But every model of scientific explanation will plausibly demand that the explanans 
itself can consistently be held true if it is supposed to explain anything. Therefore it 
should at the very least be possible to assume that the concretising conditions’ claims 
about the system under discussions actually apply. 
A few words should be said about the choice of the concept of analogy to 
characterise the relation between phenomenological and theoretical model. This 
concept’s use within philosophy of science goes back to Mary Hesse (1963)—especially 
the notion of positive analogy, meaning the set of features that the two analogous 
systems are assumed to definitely share. Hesse spelled out analogy in terms of similarity 
(cf. Hesse, 1963, 66), so why not speak of similarity in the first place? I think the 
concept of analogy is to be preferred because it highlights the active part of the scientist 
that is often required in order to bring phenomenological and theoretical models 
together. Peter Achinstein described analogy as a relation that is proposed by a speaker 
who is asking “those for whom the analogy is intended to think of X’s as Y’s.” 
(Achinstein, 1968, 207). In our case, the relevant analogy was to see the pattern of 
spectral lines (as represented in the Rydberg formula) as the radiation emitted by 
electrons falling into lower stationary states. It was Bohr himself who drew the 
analogy—as soon as he saw the formula, if we are to trust his own account of the story.  
(Again, this is not to presume that some analogy is always required to bridge the 
phenomenological-theoretical gap in every case of scientific modelling. In some cases, 
where the modelling process is from the outset integrating theoretical and 
phenomenological considerations in one representation, the analogical step will become 
unnecessary. Morrison’s example of Ludwig Prandtl’s boundary layer model of fluid 
dynamics may be a case in point. Cf. Morrison, 1999, §3.4.2.) 
Altogether, an explanation in accordance with the suggested scheme contains 
many hypothetical elements. The theoretical model emerges from the theoretical 
elements with the aid of concretising conditions, some of which might be hypothetical. 
Likewise, the phenomenological model will contain many creative elements, in its 
material as well as in its conceptual manipulations, that cannot be justified in every 
detail by appeal to observed facts or established theory. And finally, the analogy 
between the two models of different types always includes an hypothetical aspect, for it 
basically consists in the hypothetical assumption that the phenomenological model can 
be seen (i.e., described and explained) as a structure like the one specified in the 
theoretical model. 
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Therefore, an explanation where the explanandum P has the status of a necessary 
conclusion can only be found within the theoretical model. For the complete 
explanation, taking all mediating layers into account, cannot simply give the reasons 
that P has/had to take place and nothing else. Instead, what it gives is roughly the 
following: 
• Assuming that the phenomenological model Φ represents the phenomenon in good 
enough approximation … 
• … and assuming that Φ can be understood as a system like the one specified in the 
theoretical model Θ (on the basis of an analogy) … 
• … and assuming that the natural laws from theory T do in fact manifest themselves 
in such a system in approximately the way that the concretising conditions from Θ 
suggest … 
… P has/had to take place and nothing else. 
Summing up, we can say that the suggested scheme only requires a nomological 
explanation to show that ◊e n P. Here, the operator ◊e symbolises possibility in terms of 
an epistemic modality,14 while n stands for the nomological necessity of the involved 
laws. A successful explanation would then demonstrate that it is epistemically possible 
that P is nomologically necessary. 
Therefore, let us pause a moment and ponder whether such an explanation can at 
all be satisfactory. The question can be posed in the following way: Can a satisfactory 
answer to a why-question take the form ◊e n P? 
We know from our everyday experience with the language game pertaining to 
questions of the form “Why P?” that an answer to such a question need not necessarily 
consist of the specification of secured knowledge that entails P. Often, a satisfactory 
answer takes the form of a possible story according to which P had to take place and 
nothing else. A general kind of example for this is provided by certain typical 
probabilistic explanations that go along the following lines: “P took place because 
under the given circumstances there is an increased probability for such and such 
processes to occur.” The explanation in these cases suggests a story that is probable, 
though not certain (viz., that the processes in question did indeed occur) and according 
to which P had to take place. (As is well known, such explanations can even succeed 
when the probabilities in question are low, as in the notorious example: “Why does X 
suffer from paresis?—Given his history of untreated latent syphilis, there is a known, 
non-zero probability of certain physiological processes to occur that inevitably lead to 
paresis.”) 
Other examples can be found in many evolutionary explanations of questions like 
“Why do these organisms have this puzzling trait?” Often, the answer consists in a story 
that details how, if the biological kind in question has evolved under certain specified 
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circumstances for an extended period of time, that accounts for just the set of traits that 
were found perplexing before. Again, the story must be possible, but need not be 
conclusively verified by a corpus of secured knowledge for the explanation to be 
satisfactory. 
The proof that it is epistemically possible that P is nomologically necessary can 
be just as satisfactory as these familiar kinds of explanation that tell or suggest a 
possible story according to which P had to take place, because in the end it does just the 
same. (In this sense, we can understand the Bohr model, together with the 
phenomenological modelling achievements of spectroscopy, as producing a possible 
story according to which the hydrogen atom has to emit just the kind of spectral 
radiation that it in fact does emit.) This is why nomological explanations according to 
the liberalised scheme can give satisfactory answers to scientific why-questions.  
The approach to regard scientific explanations as answers to scientific why-
questions was set off mainly by Bas van Fraassen (1980, ch. 5).15 His pragmatic theory 
was severely criticised because he had forborne from determining what kinds of relation 
qualify as the “relevance relation” in which the explanans should stand to the 
explanandum (and its contrast class) and had therefore, according to his critics, rendered 
the notion of explanation arbitrary. (Cf. Kitcher and Salmon 1987.)16 No such 
arbitrariness befalls my suggestions in this section. For the scheme that I am proposing, 
though liberalised, is much more traditional than van Fraassen’s; it is a scheme for 
nomological explanations and should not be considered a pragmatic approach. The 
relevance relation at the core of each explanation is nomological necessitation. 
Although enclosed in a big epistemic “possibly”, it is always nomological necessitation 
that carries the explanatory force. 
In the 1960’s, some philosophers found it important to note that not every 
explanation need be an answer to a why-question, and that some are answers to how-
possibly-questions instead. (Cf. Hempel 1965, 428-430.) In terms of this distinction, it 
might be remonstrated that explanations in accordance with the suggested liberalised 
scheme of nomological explanation provide answers to how-possibly-questions rather 
than why-questions. I see no reason to object. In fact I find it suitable to say that Bohr’s 
explanatory achievement was to answer the question: “How can it possibly be that the 
radiation emitted by hydrogen atoms always takes the form of the characteristic 
spectrum we are observing?” 
To conclude, it is two things that all these considerations taken together point to. 
Firstly, the thesis that there can be no question of an immediate deductive relation 
between the elements of theory and the description of the phenomenon is neatly 
reproducible for the prominent example of Bohr’s first model of the hydrogen atom. But 
Bohr’s theoretical model and the spectroscopic phenomenological model succeed in 
mediating between the theoretical level and the phenomena.17 In doing so, Bohr’s model 
presupposes a peculiar ensemble of elements of theory and extends its explanatory force 
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to cover an heretofore unexplained phenomenon. The second lesson I propose to draw 
from this is therefore the following: If we liberalise our demands on nomological 
explanations, we do not need to abandon natural laws’ claim to explanation. 
 
Notes
 
1
  The nomological scheme automatically turns every prediction from natural laws into 
an explanation. In many cases, this contradicts our intuitive judgements on what 
constitutes an explanation. The notorious problem example is the “explanation” of 
the length of a flag pole by means of the length of its shadow and the position of the 
sun. 
2
  See, e.g., McMullin, 1968, esp. 393. 
3
  A most precise look can be found in the many excellent analyses of Bohr’s model 
undertaken by historians of science. See esp. Heilbron and Kuhn, 1969, Heilbron, 
1977, Mehra and Rechenberg, 1982, chapter II and Darrigol, 1992, chapters 5 & 6. 
4
  Cf. Cartwright, 1989, 207: “For the end-point of theory-licensed concretization is 
always a law true just in a model.” 
5
  A thorough treatment of the history of spectroscopy can be found esp. in McGucken, 
1969 and Mehra and Rechenberg, 1982, 156-168. 
6
  Vogel experimented with different procedures, cf. Vogel, 1879b, 587. 
7
  Cf., e.g., Haken and Wolf, 1993, 102 f. 
8
  Cf. Balmer, 1885, 83. Different values for h had to be assumed to accommodate the 
measurements of each respective experimenter, but the deviations lay within 
tolerable limits. 
9
  In a letter to Huggins, as quoted in McGucken 1969, 120 f. 
10
  In a report on ‘The Genesis of Spectra’, as quoted in Mehra and Rechenberg 1952, 
161 f. 
11
  Assuming the relation RH = 4/h to Balmer’s constant h. 
12
  It does no harm that the core representation of the phenomenological model, (6), is a 
formula that was later also derived within a theoretical model. What is decisive is 
that it was first arrived at by a process of idealisation and generalisation that started 
from measurements and observations and hardly received any theoretical input (with 
the possible exception of the very abstract notion that there should be a uniform 
mathematical representation for all the wavelengths).  
13
  Independent from the verification of the explanandum, that is. In the ancestor of all 
nomological schemes, Hempel and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model, this 
is called for by the following condition: “[The theory] T must be compatible with at 
least one class of basic sentences which has [the statement of antecedent conditions] 
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C but not [the explanandum] E as a consequence.” (Hempel und Oppenheim, 1953 
[1948], 346.) 
14
  ◊e should roughly be interpreted as “possible according to best contemporary 
knowledge, i.e. permitted by established theory and not incompatible with available 
observational evidence”. 
15
  Of course, van Fraassen did have important precursors, notably Silvain Bromberger 
(1966). 
16
  It has, however, been put forward in defence of van Fraassen that he considers the 
choice of relevance relations restricted by the accepted scientific theories at the time. 
(Cf. Lloyd and Anderson, 1993 and van Fraassen, 1980, 126.) 
17
  These observations therefore fit in with the recent efforts of Margaret Morrison and 
others to establish the role of scientific models in general as one of mediators. See 
Morgan and Morrison (Eds), 1999. 
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